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TRADE COSTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Abstract 
We  test  the  hypothesis  of  the  circular  causality  between  trade  costs  and  degree  of  economic 
development using data on Italian provinces. Using different methods to control for multilateral 
resistance, we apply a gravity equation to estimate sectoral exports to 188 countries over the period 
1995-2004. Provincial trade costs are constructed as the sum of five province-specific elasticities, 
including  distance,  adjacency,  and  common  money.  We  find  that  Italian  provinces  are 
heterogeneous with respect to trade costs. These costs are influenced by lagged provincial per capita 
income and industrial structure. In turn, trade costs influence future provincial per capita income. 
This two-way relationship between trade costs and income is broadly consistent with the cumulative 
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In this paper we test the hypothesis of the circular causality between trade costs (TCs) and degree of 
economic development using data on Italian provinces. This bi-directional causality is a typical 
implication of New Economic Geography (NEG) models but, to our knowledge, it has not been 
tested before. To motivate our hypothesis, we draw on the link between TCs and cross-border trade 
flows and the link between TCs and spatial economic disparities.  
There is ample evidence that TCs play an important role in international trade. A decline in 
international transportation costs, a component of TCs, is a likely cause underlying the sharp rise of 
world trade relative to world output that has occurred over the last fifty years (Hummels, 2007). 
Transportation costs rise with distance and, consequently, close countries tend to trade more than 
distant countries. Trade-enhancing characteristics that counteract transportation costs are: common 
language  (Helliwell,  1999;  Hutchinson,  2002),  common  colonial  roots  (Rauch,  1999),  shared 
religion (Kang and Fratianni, 2006), immigrant links to the home country (Gould, 1994; Head and   3 
Ries,  1998)  or  more  generally  ethnic  networks  (Rauch  and  Trindade,  2001),  and  similarity  in 
economic  development  (Fratianni  and  Kang,  2006).  Beyond  culture,  cross-border  trade  is 
influenced by institutions such as regional trade agreements (Carrère, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 
2009) and common money (Rose, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2002). 
Last but not least, national borders are a big impediment to trade (McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 
1998;  Anderson  and  van  Wincoop,  2003;  Chen,  2004).  Behrens  et  al.  (2007)  break  down  the 
complex range of TCs in a transportation component and a non-transportation component (e.g., 
border-related impediments and differences in languages and in monies). These authors find that the 
former impacts on the location of firms whereas the latter exerts a global impact. In their extensive 
survey, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, 691-2; AvW henceforth) estimate that TCs represent the 
equivalent of a 170 percent ad-valorem tax barrier to trade, of which 21 percent attributable to 
transportation costs, 44 percent to border-related impediments, and 55 percent to distribution costs. 
In sum, TCs are large and complex. An often cited paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argues that 
TCs are the common cause to six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.  
  TCs are also critical in NEG, which is concerned with the spatial distribution of production 
facilities and agglomeration factors. Krugman (1991), the leader of NEG, develops a core-periphery 
model  that  hinges  critically  on  the  interaction  of  transportation  costs  with  scale  economies  in 
production.
1  The  model  features  a  sector,  agriculture,  with  constant  returns  to  scale  and  an 
immobile factor of production, land, and another sector, manufacturing, with increasing returns to 
scale and a mobile factor, labor. Pecuniary spillovers trigger a “circular causation” process whereby 
manufacturing  tends  to  concentrate  in  locations  with  large  markets  that,  in  turn,  lead  to  more 
concentration because those locations enjoy lower effective prices and attract mobile labor. The 
outcome is the endogenous formation of a richer industrial core and a poorer agricultural periphery, 
or more generally regional economic disparities. The income differences result from differences in 
prices, with workers in the core enjoying higher real wages than in the periphery. Agglomeration 
accentuates as transportation costs decline, giving more incentive to footloose manufacturing to 
                                                 
1 On this point, see the survey article by Head and Mayer (2004).   4 
relocate. Agglomeration can also arise through cost and demand linkages stemming from firms 
using intermediate goods (Venables, 1996) or through innovation (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001).  
The  spatial  distribution  of  industrial  activities  and  income  is  affected  critically  by  TCs. 
When TCs are high, interregional trade is low and industrial activities are widely diffused. As TCs 
decline, agglomeration, with its attendant benefits of increasing returns and external economies, 
develops in core areas (what is core is largely a path-dependent process). Agglomeration is fed by 
the industrial sector drawing the mobile factor, say labor. If labor is mobile only between sectors in 
the same region, the agglomeration process reaches a turning point when real wage differentials are 
sufficiently high to induce firms to relocate from the high-wage agglomerated region to the low-
wage non-agglomerated region. In this case, periods of industrial concentration are followed by 
periods of a more even spatial distribution of industrial activities (Puga 1999; Bosker et al. 2007). 
The spatial distribution of per capita income will also mimic such a pattern. If labor is instead 
mobile among regions, the agglomeration process in the core region will continue until real returns 
on labor are equalized across regions. In this case, the spatial distribution of industrial activities 
remains asymmetric and regional economic development is heterogeneous. In sum, causality runs 
from TCs to agglomeration and income. But there is also the opposite causality from agglomeration 
to TCs. The core attracts firms and labor from the periphery because it enjoys higher productivity, 
including  sectors  such  as  information  services  and  distribution  that  are  so  important  for 
international and interregional trade. Scale economies from agglomeration reduce TCs. The core 
also  benefits  from  better  infrastructure  and  public  administration  resulting  from  agglomeration, 
which tend to reduce TCs. In the end, causality is potentially bi-directional. 
   To test our hypothesis, we follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate provincial TCs 
using a gravity equation (GE) applied to bilateral trade flows from the viewpoint of a country, Italy, 
that shares common culture and national institutions, but suffers from regional disparities. Second, 
we test the mentioned two-way causality between provincial TCs and provincial per capita income, 
our measure of economic development. While Italy is not the only industrial country with regional 
disparities, its heterogeneity is long dated: the Mezzogiorno problem, or the relative low degree of   5 
economic development of the Italian South, goes back to the creation of the nation in 1861 and has 
defied decades of large government transfers from the North to the South over the last fifty years. 
Much  has  been  written  on  the  subject  both  inside  and  outside  Italy;  space  permits  only  a  few 
references. Lutz (1962) is among the first to analyze in depth the Italian dual economy, which exists 
not only geographically but also across industries. Her policy prescription is wage flexibility in the 
South and interregional mobility of labor and capital. Chenery (1962, 515) examines the policy of 
the Italian government “to carry out the theoretically attractive procedure of developing external 
economies by a massive dose of public works while leaving the direct investment in commodity 
production to private individuals.” This policy has continued to these days despite the persistence of 
the North-South economic divide. Labor mobility across regions remains relatively low (Mocetti 
and Porello, 2010), a fact that is difficult to reconcile with the gap in per capita income. The twin 
occurrence of large geographic economic differences and labor immobility remains an “empirical 
puzzle” (Faini et al. 1997).  
The literature on regional disparities has gone beyond the North-South characterization. For 
example, Bagnasco (1977) identifies three distinct economic areas: an old capital-intensive North-
West, which he calls First Italy; an agricultural and backward South, which he calls Second Italy; 
and a newer North-East and parts of the Center, which he calls Third Italy. Third Italy is replete 
with dynamic small and medium size firms that outsource production and are located in industrial 
districts (Brusco, 1990). These districts specialize in different products and are distinctive in their 
development  paths,  local  institutions,  and  manners  of  generating  externalities  (Becattini,  1990, 
2007).
2  
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the general form of GE in the 
presence of multilateral TCs. In Section III, we formulate the empirical equations of our two-step 
approach. Section IV discusses the data. Section V presents and analyzes the findings. Section VI 
deals with robustness tests. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.  
 
                                                 
2 Markusen (1996) discusses different types of industrial districts (agglomeration).   6 
 
II. THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COSTS 
In a well-known paper, McCallum (1995) applied a GE to 1988 exports and imports among ten 
Canadian provinces and thirty U.S. states and found that inter-provincial trade was approximately 
twenty times larger than trade between provinces and states; in essence, the US-Canadian border is 
very thick. AvW (2003) criticized McCallum’s findings mostly for ignoring multilateral TCs and 
argued that general-equilibrium considerations dictate that trade flows from region i to region j 
depend,  among  other  factors,  not  only  on  bilateral  TCs,  but  also  on  multilateral  ones.
3  When 
multilateral costs rise relative to bilateral costs, trade flows rise between i and j. These authors 






















X   ,          (1) 
where X = exports from i to j, Y = nominal income, t = bilateral TC factor, P = multilateral TC 
factor  (i.e.,  consumer  price  index),  σ  =  elasticity  of  substitution  among  goods,  and  i,  j,  and  w 
indicate,  respectively,  exporter  country,  importer  country  and  the  world.  Assuming  that  tij  is  a 
function  of  bilateral  distance  and  one  plus  the  tariff-equivalent  bilateral  border  barrier,  AvW 
estimate with nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations on cross-section data. 
Their main result is that borders reduce trade in the range of 20 to 50 percent, that is much less than 
the border found by McCallum. 
  The AvW estimation procedure is rather cumbersome and other authors have sought simpler 
alternatives. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) obtain virtually identical results with bonus vetus (good 
old) ordinary least square (OLS, henceforth) using a first-order log-linear Taylor series expansion to 
approximate multilateral resistance with appropriate exogenous variables captured by country fixed 
effects (FE henceforth). Following Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Feenstra (2003), and Cheng and 
Wall (2003), Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) instead propose time-invariant country-specific dummies 
                                                 
3  The  immediate  predecessor  of  AvW  is  Anderson  (1979).  Other  theoretical  foundations  of  GE  are  provided  by 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1998), Helpman (1987), and Haveman and Hummels (2004).   7 
for cross-section data and time-varying country dummies and country-pair FE for panel data. In 
panel data, the time-varying country dummies remove the time-series correlation and the country-
pair FE the cross-sectional correlation. However, country-pair dummies (simply, pair dummies) are 
time-invariant and consequently can only in part account for the multilateral resistance factor; serial 
correlation remains. There are two downsides to this procedure. The first is that it involves a great 
number of dummies and the estimation depends on sample size. The second is that pair dummies 
capture all FEs, including distance elasticity, and consequently make it impossible to distinguish 
among parameters of various time-invariant variables. The alternative to the second downside is 
provided by Carrère (2006) who models pair dummies as random variables (RE henceforth). By 
employing  pair  REs,  we  can  still  apply  the  Baldwin  and  Taglioni’s  approach  to  handle  the 
multilateral  resistance  factor,  but  in  addition  we  can  estimate  the  impact  of  distance  on  trade 
(Fratianni et al. 2010).  
 
III. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE TWO-STEP APPROACH 
We discuss in this section the empirical procedure and econometric methodology underlying the 
two-step approach. In the first part, we focus on the construction of provincial TCs. These are the 
sum of five components: distance, adjacency, common and different regional trade agreements, and 
common money. In the second part, we lay out the model of circular causation between provincial 
TCs and provincial per capita income. 
Step 1: Gravity equation and provincial trade costs 
The  specification  of  TCs  is  the  subject  of  theoretical  and  empirical  debate;  see,  for  example, 
Fingleton  and  McCann  (2007).  Bosker  and  Garretsen  (2007)  discuss  and  estimate  various 
specification of TCs and conclude in favor of the “implied TC” specification (see their equation 16). 
Since our data do not permit such an estimation, we follow the trade literature in defining TCs in a   8 
multiplicative form.
4 Specifically, the TC of the k
th product exported by the Italian i
th province to 
the j
th importer country is given by (see Carrère, 2006):  
] [ 4 3 2 1 0 ij jt jt jt ADJACENCY MONEY InterRTA RTA
ij ijt e d t
r r r r r + + + × = ,    (2) 
where dij is bilateral distance, RTA (InterRTA) is a dummy that assumes 1 (0) when i and j belong to 
the same (different) regional trade agreement, MONEY and ADJACENCY are dummies that assume 
1 when i and j share the same money or a common land border.
5 Institutional and cultural factors 
such as common language, colonial relationships and immigrant links are irrelevant in the Italian 
context and have been omitted.
6 As to the signs of the coefficients, ρ0 is positive and ρ3 and ρ4 are 
negative. The signs of ρ1 and ρ2, instead, depend on whether the RTA is trade creating or trade 
diverting. If the RTA is trade creating, both ρ1 and ρ2 are negative; if the RTA is trade diverting ρ1 is 
negative but ρ2 is positive (Carrère, 2006). A RTA could evolve over time from a trade-creating to a 
trade-diverting institution (Fratianni and Oh, 2009). 
Substituting (2) in (1), we obtain a testable GE at the provincial level that is similar to AvW’s 
(2003) equation 19:  
ijt
f
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where  ( )
s s - - =
1 1 ln jt it
w
t P P Y A  is the multilateral resistance factor, Yi and Yj are respectively nominal 
income of i and j, and Z(f) is the set of four variables that affects TC in addition to distance: 
Z1=RTA, Z2=InterRTA, Z3=MONEY, and Z4=ADJACENCY. Distance elasticity  0 0 ) 1 ( r s b - =  is 
negative  since  the  elasticity  of  substitution  σ  is  larger  than  unity;  the  four  semi-elasticities 
f f r s b ) 1 ( - =   are  positive,  except  for  β2  <  0  when  the  RTA  is  trade  diverting;  εijt  is  an 
idiosyncratic error.  
                                                 
4 The implied TC specification requires data on total consumption of goods only produced by the province. Since we 
lack inter-provincial trade flows, we cannot implement this procedure. 
5 All Italian provinces share the same regional trade agreements and currency. While RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY have 
a global impact, their provincial export elasticities can differ due to different frequencies of  these three factors in each 
province. Sixteen Italian provinces are adjacent to either France, Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia.  
6 Italian, as the majority’s language, is only spoken in Italy. Colonial relationships with former colonies Libya, Somalia 
and Eritrea were too short lived to be of any relevance. Emigrants’ relationships are primarily with the home country. 
Furthermore, these relationships have diminished over time and are captured in our model by importer country FE. 
   9 
Sectoral distance  elasticities are estimated under the restriction that these elasticities are 
common to all provinces (a restriction imposed by data availability). Provincial distance elasticities 
are  then  computed  as  the  weighted  average  of  sectoral  export  distance  elasticities,  where  the 
weights are given by the average shares of provincial sectoral exports. This approach ignores the 
potentially positive effects on distance resulting from the interaction between industrial sectors and 
location generated, among other things, by agglomeration externalities (Fratianni and Marchionne, 
2008). Thus, our test is conservative because it works against our hypothesis. Distance in (3) is 
replaced by the interaction of distance with sectoral dummies. Since coefficient β0 varies among 
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where K is the number of sectors, and δ(k) is a sector dummy. 
Provincial  TC,  denoted  by  βi,  is  the  sum  of  five  elasticities:  provincial  distance, 
ADJACENCY, RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY.
7 Provincial distance elasticity is the weighted average 
of sectoral distance elasticities, β0,k. The ADJACENCY elasticity is the estimated semi-elasticity β4 
multiplied by the frequency of provincial trade with common-border countries (by definition, the 
ADJACENCY frequency of non bordering provinces is zero). The same procedure holds for RTA, 
InterRTA, and MONEY.
8  
Equation  (4)  is  estimated  with  three  alternative  methods  to  control  for  multilateral 
resistance: (a) exporter province, importer country, and year FEs, (b) province-country pair REs and 
year FEs (c) is the sum of methods (a) and (b). Method (a), a three-way FE ( t j i A m p l + + = ), is 
                                                 
7 In the language of Behrens et al. (2007), RTA, InterRTA and MONEY would qualify as non-transport costs with a 
“global impact” on trade. 
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where  i f Z ) ( indicate the frequency of RTA, InterRTA, MONEY, ADJACENCY in total trade of province i. Given that 
k , 0 b < 0, and  f b and  i , 4 b  have small numerical values, it follows that  i b < 0.    10 
better than a pure OLS because the latter fails to control for all specific effects (Egger 2000). 
Method  (b)  applies  specific  effects  to  province-country  pairs,  but  not  to  individual  exporter 
provinces and importer countries ( t ij A m w + = ). We model pair specific effects as REs instead of 
FEs to avoid collinearity with distance (Carrère 2006). This method captures the bulk but not all 
specific effects. Method (c) combines (a) and (b) and encompasses all time-invariant multilateral 
resistance  factors  ( t ij j i A m w p l + + + = ).  We  cannot  apply  country-time  dummies  and  pair 
dummies proposed by Baldwin and Taglioni ( ij jt it A w p l + + = ) because of the excessive number 
of dummy variables.
9 Our method (c) is the closest feasible specification of Baldwin and Taglioni’s 
GE. Both (b) and (c) are based on the assumption that province-country pairs behave randomly and 
thus permit us to estimate distance coefficients for each of the 21 sectors. 
Step 2: TC-income circular causation 
The second step in our research strategy involves testing the bi-directional causality between TCs 
and provincial per capita income, our proxy of economic development. We have already mentioned 
that NEG underscores both the impact of TCs on income as well as the impact of income on TCs. 
This circular causation is tested with the following two equations: 
( ) 1 , 1 , , , - - = t i t i t i C y g b           (5a) 
( ) 1 , 1 , , , - - = t i t i t i C h y b ,          (5b) 
where  i b   is  mean-adjusted  provincial  TC  expressed  in  numerical  value,  i y   is  mean-adjusted 
provincial per capita income, and Ci is a set of control variables that are typically associated with 
economic development and TCs, such as provincial industrial structure (IND), infrastructure (INF), 
institutional efficiency (INS), social capital (SC), and human capital (HC).
10 Provincial TCs and 
provincial  per  capita  income  are  measured  relative  to  their  mean  values  to  minimize  potential 
common bias.
11  
                                                 
9 We have 1,030 exporter country-time dummies, 1,880 importer country-time dummies and 16,629 pair REs. 
10 For the relevance of institutional efficiency, see La Porta et al. (2000), for social capital see Putnam (1993) and 
Putnam and Helliwell (1995), and for human capital see Lucas (1988). 
11 Denoting with I the number of Italian provinces (I=103) and recalling that βi < 0,  i b is:    11 
In the actual tests, g(.) and h(.) are linearized. Lagged regressors are employed to minimize 
endogeneity problems due to simultaneity ( i b , however, being a panel estimate is centered in the 
middle of the time period). It should also be noted that  i b  are retrieved from heteroskedastic (4) 
and used in (5a)-(5b). We correct for heteroskedasticity in (5) with robust standard errors.  
 
IV. DATA 
Different datasets are used to estimate provincial TCs (Step 1) and circular causation (Step 2).  
Step 1 dataset 
The  dataset  in  Step  1  consists  of  972,754  observations  covering  103  Italian  provinces,  188 
countries, and 21 sectors over the period 1995-2004. The data come from different sources. Annual 
exports  by  province,  country,  and  sector  come  from  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics 
(ISTAT); they include all bilateral flows in excess of one euro recorded by custom offices.
12 The 
data are subject to a potential magnification effect due to vertical specialization (Hummels et al., 
2001): re-exporting may occur when part of the intermediate production process is localized abroad. 
In these instances, export data overestimate the true but unknown value of exports (AvW, 2004). 
We eliminate sector “Ships and aircrafts, etc.” because it lacks a specific destination and exports to 
politically  undefined  areas  (e.g.,  Antarctica)  or  remote  parts  of  a  country  (e.g.,  Denmark’s 
Greenland). ISTAT is also the source of provincial population and income, the latter measured as 
the sum of value added in agriculture, industry and services  except public sector and financial 
services.  
Country income and population come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the 
World  Bank.  We  lose  some  records  in  merging  the  two  datasets  because  of  the  mismatching 
between ISTAT export destination and WDI country definition (e.g., Timor-Leste). We lose records 
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b b b . 
This  procedure  eliminates  common  factors  and  detrends  idiosyncratic  factors.  In  other  words,  the  mean-adjusted 
provincial TC is the difference between provincial TC, with a positive sign, and its mean value over all provinces, again 
with a positive sign.  
12 In contrast to US states, trade flows among Italian provinces are not recorded; see footnote 4.   12 
because  income  is  not  reported  for  some  countries  (e.g.,  Brunei).  These  inevitable  trimmings, 
however, are of little consequence for the final research outcome. Variable dij is measured as the 
kilometric geodesic distance between province i‘s capital and country j’s capital. Data on provincial 
latitude and longitude are provided by the official web sites of each province; data on capitals’ 
latitude and longitude are from the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency.  
As to institutional factors, we define 11 separate RTAs, with year of entry and exit of each 
member.
13 Italy is a member of the European Union and when a province trades with a country that 
is a member of another RTA, the InterRTA dummy is equal to one. Information on common money, 
the euro, comes from the European Commission.  
Table 1a presents descriptive statistics of our dataset. Average provincial income is $11.3 
billion (Panel A) vs. an average country income of $168.3 billion (Panel B).
14 15.5 percent of Italian 
provinces have a common land border with foreign countries. 7.1 percent of provincial trade flows 
go to members of the European Union, 3.2 percent to countries that share the same currency (the 
euro), and 28 percent to countries affiliated with other RTAs.
15 Panel C gives descriptive statistics 
of provincial exports by sectors. Average incomes of Italian provinces and country partners rise 
from Panel A and B to Panel C because of the higher frequency of high-income provinces that 
export more than low-income provinces. The same occurs for the ratio of the number of trade 
relations among RTA members to maximum bilateral relations and for the share of common-money 
countries. On the contrary, the incidence of ADJACENCY declines relative to other institutional 
factors because few Italian provinces and country partners are adjacent. 
Average provincial exports are $2.6 billion with a standard deviation 7 times larger than the 
mean. There is no rounding bias because ISTAT reports all export values. Figure 1 shows that 
provincial exports have a profile consistent with a log-normal distribution. In the GE, the normality 
of the dependent variable is critical because estimation is done basically with OLS.  
                                                 
13 These are the European Union (EU), US-IS, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZCERTA, CACM, MECOSUR, 
ASEAN, SPARTECA, and ANDEAN; see Oh (2006) and Fratianni and Marchionne (2011). 
14 The range from $1.3 to $154.8 billion for provinces and from $ 0.041 to $11,711.8 billion for country income (with 
respective standard deviations of $15.8 and $812.5 billion) indicates high income variability. 
15 Percentages are relative to the number of trade flows and not to export value.   13 
Finally, we report the zero-values of the bilateral trade flow matrix. Complete specialization 
models,  such  as  AvW’s,  imply  that  this  matrix  must  be  full.  The  question  is  at  what  level  of 
aggregation one should expect a relatively full matrix. Haveman and Hummels (2004, 211) report a 
73 percent matrix fullness at the four-digit SITC level. Although our level of disaggregation is 
shallower  than  the  four-digit  SITC  category,  we  expect  more  zeros  because  of  geographical 
disaggregation.
16  With  972,754  actual  observations  against  a  potential  number  of  4,066,440 
observations, our trade matrix has a 24 percent average fullness. Table 2 shows the distribution of 
fullness by sector. Relative large numbers in the table reflect comparative advantage and diffuse 
localization  of  production.  Typical  Italian  products  such  as  “Machinery  and  Equipment”  and 
“Textiles  and  Textile  Products”  are  6  to  11  times  fuller  than  sectors  with  low  comparative 
advantage, such as “Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel.” In general, given the 
geographical and sectoral disaggregation of our dataset, Table 2 suggests a moderate zero flow 
problem. We will return to this issue in the robustness section of the paper. 
Step 2 dataset 
The dataset of Step 2 consists of 103 observations. Per capita GDP and human capital data come 
from  the  I.Stat  data  warehouse  of  ISTAT;  industrial  structure  and  infrastructure,  from  the 
GeoWebStarter data warehouse of the Tagliacarne Institute; and institutional efficiency and social 
capital from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, GSZ henceforth). The GSZ dataset has only 92 
Italian provinces because their survey (from 1989 to 1995) excludes data on eight new provinces 
created in 1995 and on smaller and unrepresentative provinces.
17  
Our measure of provincial industrial structure is the ratio of industrial value added to total 
value added (IND). Recent literature suggests that larger and more productive firms play a crucial 
role in export trade flows (Helpman et al., 2004). We check for this effect with the ratio of value 
added by large firms to value added by small firms in the manufacturing sector (IND(LG/SM)). We 
also employ two alternative measures of infrastructure, institutional inefficiency, social capital, and 
                                                 
16 The Italian classification is called ATECO and is very similar to the international ISIC classification. 
17 The number of Italian provinces have further increased since 1995: today (2010) they are 110.   14 
human capital. INFECO and INFTOT are composite indexes of economic and total infrastructure, 
respectively; see Tagliacarne Institute for details. INS is the average number of years necessary to 
complete  a  first-level  trial  in  the  province  and  thus  measures  institutional  inefficiency.  An 
alternative to INS, but with an opposite intended effect, is the average use of bank checks in the 
province (INS(CHECKS)). The number of donated blood bags per million inhabitants (SC) and the 
frequency of individuals who receive loans from friends and family (SC(DEBT)) are alternative 
proxies of social capital. Finally, the two proxies for human capital are the total yearly number of 
university graduates produced by the province (HC) and a higher-level subset of these graduates 
(HC(HIGH)).
18  
Italian provinces are heterogeneous in several respects. Spatial distribution of per capita 
income in 2004 ranged from less than €12,500 of Crotone and Enna (in the South) to more than 
€29,000 of Bolzano and Milano (in the North). A similar distribution held in 1995; see Panel D of 
Table 1b. Figure 3 shows maps of mean-adjusted provincial per capita GDP in 1995 and 2004. The 
2004 map is darker than the 1995 map because of nominal economic growth; economic disparities, 
however, remain virtually unchanged. Strong provincial differences emerge for INF, INS, SC, and 
HC. The lower median values than mean values suggest that INF, INS, SC, but especially for HC, 
have left-skewed distributions. All variables, except HC, have a standard deviation that is at least 66 
percent higher than the mean, again suggesting strong heterogeneity across provinces; see maps in 
Figure 2 for a visual inspection of these patterns.  
[Insert Table 1a, Table 1b, Figure 1, Table 2, and Figure 2 here] 
V. FINDINGS 
Step 1 findings 
Table 3 presents the results of the GE equation (4). We use a cluster correction for the province-
country pair and robust standard errors; the former reduces potential pair serial correlation and the 
latter corrects for the effects of heteroskedasticity. The bottom panel of the table shows summary 
                                                 
18  HC  consists  of  the  less  demanding  “diplomi  universitari”  and  more  demanding  “lauree”,  whereas  HC(HIGH) 
includes only the latter.   15 
statistics for each of the three methods. Under method (a) and (c), the likelihood ratio test reveals 
that exporter province, importer country, and year FEs provide significant explanatory power. The 
restriction that these FEs are zero is rejected, a finding that is in line with Egger’s (2000) and is 
consistent with the three-way FE model. Methods (b) and (c) impose REs on province-country 
pairs. The number of observations under method (c) falls to 625,734 because we could estimate the 
model only by eliminating all export values below $30,000.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
It is standard to evaluate the relative significance of the FE and RE specifications using the 
Hausman’s (1978) statistic  ) ( ) ( ) (
1
RE FE RE FE RE FE Var N H b b b b b b - - ¢ - =
- , where N = number of 
observations,  FE b  and  RE b  are, respectively, the coefficients’ vector of the FE and RE model, 
Var(.) is the variance-covariance operator, and H has a chi-squared distribution. We recall that pair 
FEs  are  collinear  with  the  distance-sector  interacting  variables  (and  border)  and  that  we  can 
estimate distance-sector coefficients only using pair REs (Carrère, 2006).
19 It follows that the sizes 
of  FE b  and  RE b  differ, making  ) ( RE FE Var b b -  singular and H inoperative. As a fallback position, 
we have relied on the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-Multiplier (1979, BPLM for short) statistic, 
which while not directly testing FEs vs REs nonetheless rejects the null hypothesis of zero-variance 
implied by the FE model. 
Income  elasticity  is  statistically  different  from  one  for  Italian  provinces  and  partner 
countries except for provinces under method (b). The RTA semi-elasticity suggests that EU-15 has 
been a hindrance to trade for its members. This result is in line with Frankel’s (1997) model that 
shows  that  an  expanding  RTA  reduces  welfare  and  other  evidence  that  finds  that  the  EU  has 
expanded beyond its “optimal size” (Fratianni and Oh, 2009). In our paper,  the impact of RTA on 
exports  changes  according  to  the  method:  negative  under  methods  (a)  and  (c)  and  statistically 
insignificant under method (b). It is likely that country FEs soak up a great deal of the RTA effects. 
In fact, when we drop country FEs under method (b), the statistical significance of  RTA disappears. 
InterRTA semi-elasticity, as well, changes according to the method: negative under method (a), 
                                                 
19 In some cases, FE are collinear also with RTA or MONEY because of the low variability of these dummy variables.   16 
positive under method (b), and statically insignificant under method (c). Again, we suspect that 
country  FEs  are  driving  these  results.  The  MONEY  semi-elasticity  is  positive,  economically 
relevant, and stable across methods. A pairwise correlation of 0.85 between MONEY and RTA from 
1999 to 2004 provides further justification for the negative sign of RTA, the effect of which may be 
captured, at least in part, by MONEY. The ADJACENCY semi-elasticity rises from method (a) to 
method (b) and then falls under method (c). All 21 sectoral distance elasticities are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. They  range  from a minimum of -2.02 for “Coal, 
Lignite, Peat, etc.” under method (a), to a maximum of -0.47 for “Machinery, etc.” under method 
(b). The explained variance of the regressions is between 0.35 (method b) and 0.44 (method a).  
The relative instability of RTA and Inter-RTA suggests to exclude these two components 
from the computation of provincial TCs. For the rest of the paper, our benchmark of trade costs 
consists of three components: distance, adjacency and money elasticities. In light of the fact that 
Southern provinces have a higher frequency of trade with EU countries than Northern and Central 
provinces, our narrower definition of TCs works against our hypothesis because it reduces  TC  
heterogeneity. The sensitivity of our main findings to different definitions of provincial TCs will be 
tested in the robustness section below. 
Three  examples  may  illustrate  the  construction  of  provincial  TCs  as  well  as  their 
heterogeneity; we use the results from method (c). Bologna is located in the North-Center of Italy 
and has no adjacency effect: its TC is equal to provincial distance elasticity, -0.79929, plus the 
MONEY elasticity, 0.00537; that is, -0.79392. Siracusa is located in the South of Italy and also has 
no adjacency effect: its TC is equal to a provincial distance elasticity of -0.92923 plus a MONEY 
elasticity of 0.00905;  that is, -0.92018. Aosta is located in the North-West of Italy and is adjacent 
to France and Switzerland: its TC is equal to a provincial distance elasticity of -0.82952, its own 
ADJACENCY elasticity, 0.05489, and a MONEY elasticity of 0.01149; that is, -0.76313.  
Estimated provincial TCs are highest under method (a), lowest under (b) and intermediate 
under (c). TC variances are more than three times higher under method (a) and (b) than under 
method (c). The middle map of Figure 3 displays mean-adjusted provincial TCs under method (c);   17 
see footnotes 8 and 11. The geographical disparities in TCs between the North and the South of 
Italy would have been even higher if we had displayed provincial TCs under method (a) or (b). 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Step 2 findings 
Table 4 presents the results of equations (5a) and (5b), using mean-adjusted provincial TCs,  i b , 
and mean-adjusted provincial per capita income,  i y ; see Figure 3. The main message of the table is 
that the circular causation hypothesis is corroborated: lower TCs (measured numerically) raise per 
capita income but higher per capita income, in turn, reduces TCs through a virtuous circle. More 
specifically,  Table  4a  shows  that  our  estimated  provincial  TCs  are  negatively  influenced  by 
beginning-period  mean-adjusted  provincial  per  capita  income  ( y )  and  provincial  industrial 
structure (IND), but is unaffected by infrastructure (INF), institutional inefficiency (INS), social 
capital  (SC),  and  human  capital  (HC);  see  column  TC0.  Table  4b  shows  that  ending-period 
provincial  per  capita  income  is  negatively  influenced  by  our  estimated  provincial  TCs  and 
institutional  inefficiency,  and  positively  by  IND,  INF,  SC,  and  HC,  in  sympathy  with  the 
implications of endogenous growth theory. All explanatory variables are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level, except HC whose significance is at the 5 percent level; see column IN0. The 
explanatory  power  of  the  two  regressions  is  relatively  high  considering  that  we  are  employing 
mean-adjusted dependent variables: R
2 is equal to 0.384 in TC0 and 0.668 in IN0.  
[Insert Table 4a and Table 4b here] 
In sum, TCs and provincial per capita income influence each other, while the vector Ci of 
control variables that are typically associated with economic development and TCs, impact ending-
period per capita income but not TCs, with the exception of industrial structure. It is worth noting 
that the statistical significance of industrial structure is relatively low (10 percent). It is somewhat 
puzzling  that  TCs  are  insensitive  to  infrastructure,  given  the  long  commitment  of  the  Italian 
government to invest in public works in the Mezzogiorno. A plausible explanation for this result 
has been offered by Puga (1999, 328): “The combination of minimal interregional migration with   18 
wage setting at the national sectoral level may help understand why infrastructure improvements 
have  failed  to  help  the  Italian  Mezzogiorno  catch  with  the  North  of  the  country...”  With 
interregional labor immobility and real wage differences, industrial spreading would occur with 
firms relocating from high-wage-agglomerated (and congested) areas to low-wage-unagglomerated 
areas. A common national wage rate, as it is true in Italy, could undo this mechanism.  
 
VI. ROBUSTNESS  
Step 1 robustness 
Consider high-TC provinces that trade only with close countries. For those provinces bilateral trade 
with long-distance countries would be counted as zero trade flows. Hence, there is a potential that 
zero trade flows may bias upward the algebraic estimate of the distance elasticity. Under these 
circumstances, a log-linear GE specification and OLS estimation may be inappropriate for three 
reasons  (Burger  et  al.,  2009).  The  first  has  to  do  with  the  way  zero  trade  flows  are  treated.
20 
Bilateral  trade,  at  some  level  of  disaggregation,  is  frequently  zero  or  missing  (Frankel,  1997; 
Haveman and Hummels, 2004).
21 Since these zeros do not occur randomly (Rauch, 1999), their 
omission could bias the estimates of trade determinants (Linders and De Groot, 2006). The second 
is the bias created by the logarithmic transformation: the concavity of the log function, under OLS, 
imparts a downward bias because of the Jensen’s inequality (Haworth and Vincent, 1979). The third 
is  the  failure  of  the  homoskedasticity  assumption.  With  non-negative  exports,  the  variance  of 
exports conditional on exogenous variables declines as the conditional mean of exports approaches 
the lower zero limit (Santo-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Trade data are potentially heteroskedastic, 
whereas  the  log-normal  model  assumes  homoskedasticity.  In  these  cases,  OLS  estimations  are 
inconsistent and inefficient.  
                                                 
20 The assumption of log-normality in the random component implies the double-logarithmic specification that predicts 
positive trade flows. In contrast, the multiplicative GE can predict zero values. 
21 Zeros can occur either because some country pairs do not trade, or rounding errors, or observations are mistakenly 
recorded as zero. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) reckon that measurement errors may pose a more serious problem 
than the log-linear transformation bias.   19 
To deal with these issues, researchers have either omitted zero trade flows, or arbitrarily 
added a small positive number to all trade flows so that their logarithm is well-defined, or used a 
TOBIT estimator with zero lower limit for trade flows, or relied on the Heckman selection model 
criterion. All these standard solutions, however, have their own problems.
22 Recently, Poisson and 
modified  Poisson  models  have  received  increasing  attention  (Santos-Silva  and  Tenreyro,  2006; 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2007; Burger et al., 2009). The Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator 
(PML, henceforth) is particularly suitable for GE models: it solves the zero trade flows problem, its 
multiplicative  form  avoids  the  log-linearization  bias,  while  the  maximum  likelihood  estimation 
controls for heteroskedasticity. Its downside is that the required abundance of dummies to control 
for multilateral resistance makes estimation convergence difficulty.  
Table 5 summarizes our robustness checks by showing the correlation matrix of βi estimated 
with OLS and PML for each of our three methods. The correlation coefficients shown in the matrix 
are  very  high,  suggesting  that  our  analysis  is  robust  to  different  methodologies.  We  have  also 
employed  other  estimators  with  similar  results,  such  as  negative  binomial,  pseudo-Poisson 
maximum likelihood estimator, and feasible generalized least squares; for space reasons, results are 
not shown.
23 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Step 2 robustness 
We perform four different types of robustness exercises concerning equations (5a)-(5b). The first is 
to add IND(LG/SM) to IND to check the hypothesis that exports are driven primarily by large and 
more profitable enterprises, as suggested by Helpman et al. (2008). Our findings do not support this 
hypothesis; see column TC1 of Table 4a. Nor do we find a significant impact of IND(LG/SM) on 
the income regression; see IN1 in Table 4b. The second is to employ alternative measures of INF, 
                                                 
22  The  zero  omission  option  involves  a  data  truncation  and  leads  to  biased  results,  especially  with  non  randomly 
distributed zero flows (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998); the constant addition option generates regression coefficients 
either decreasing with the size of the added constant (Flowerdew and Aitkin, 1982) or unsystematically higher or lower 
than the added constant (King, 1988); TOBIT performs poorly (Santo-Silva and Tenreyro 2006); and the Heckman 
selection model expands considerably the dataset with no material improvement (Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2007). 
23 For a comparison of different estimators in the GE, see Fratianni, Marchionne, Oh (2010).   20 
INS, SC, and HC. The only significant changes in the income regression are: SC(DEBT) is not 
statistically significant, whereas SC is; and HC becomes statistically less significant in the presence 
of the INF and INS alternatives. No significant changes, on the other hand, take place in the trade 
cost  regressions.  Overall,  the  coefficients  are  fairly  stable  and  the  main  thrust  of  the  message 
remains.  The  third  is  to  employ  two  alternative  definitions  of  provincial  TCs  to  our  three-
component benchmark: a narrower one that excludes MONEY (because of its strong correlation 
with RTA), and an expansive one that adds RTA and InterRTA (full specification of TCs). With the 
narrower definition results are virtually the same for both regressions; see TC0
- and IN0
- of Table 
4a-4b.  With  the  expansive  definition,  IND  and  HC  rise  in  statistical  significance  in  the  TC 
regression (see TC0
+ in Table 4a), whereas become insignificant in the income regression (see IN0
+ 
in Table 4b). The implication is that under the expansive definition of TC, IND and HC affect 
income  indirectly through TCs. Our conclusion is that the instability of the RTA and InterRTA 
coefficients in Table 3 argues for the benchmark TC specification. The final exercise relates to the 
use of estimated parameters as regressors, that is the retrieval of the betas from step 1 to step 2. We 
follow Saxonhouse (1976) and use a bootstrap procedure –with 100, 1,000 and 10,000 replications– 
to estimate the standard errors of the parameter estimates. The results do not change with respect to 
robust standard errors. 
  In sum, our robustness exercise confirms the main findings of the previous section.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The key result of the paper is that regional economic development and trade costs in Italy 
are related to each other through a circular causation pattern: lower TCs raise per capita income, but 
higher per capita income, in turn, reduces TCs through a virtuous circle. Our approach consists of 
two steps. In the first step, we estimate, with a gravity model, sectoral distance elasticities from 103 
Italian provinces exporting 21 export categories to 188 countries under the restriction that these 
elasticities  are  common  to  all  provinces;  these  sectoral  elasticities  are  then  weighed  by  the 
provincial export mix. Provincial TCs are the sum of  several separate elasticities, of which only   21 
one is a distance elasticity.
 By design, this approach ignores the potentially positive effects on TCs 
emanating from the interaction of industrial sectors and location generated, among other things, by 
agglomeration  externalities.  By  so  doing,  our  test  works  against  our  hypothesis.  The  spatial 
distribution of provincial TCs appears to be consistent with the main implications of agglomeration 
theory: with few exceptions, provinces in the “First Italy” (North-West) and “Third Italy” (North-
East  and  parts  of  the  Center)  face  lower  TCs  than  provinces  in  the  developing  South.  To  our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that applies the gravity equation to trading pairs whose bilateral 
distances differ by extremely small measure. 
 In the second step, we test the bi-directional  causality between TCs  and provincial per 
capita  income,  our  proxy  of  economic  development,  drawing  from  the  insights  of  the  New 
Economic Geography. In addition to the interaction between trade costs and provincial per capita 
income, we find that control variables that are typically associated with economic development 
impact  provincial  per  capita  income  but  not  TCs.  We  explain  this  finding,  in  part,  with  the 
institutional practice in Italy to bargain for a nation-wide sectoral wage rate, a practice that tends to 
counteract the positive effects of government investment programs in the poorer regions of the 
country  and  reduces  firms’  incentives  to  relocate  from  richer  agglomerated  to  poorer  non-
agglomerated areas.  
  One obvious policy implication of our paper is that government should promote reductions 
of TCs through efficiency-increasing reforms that would benefit disproportionately the backward 
regions  of  the  country.  The  other  policy  implication,  greatly  opposed  by  trade  unions,  is  to 
encourage wage bargaining that would set wages at the regional rather than at the national level. 
 
References 
Anderson, J.E., 1979. A theoretical foundation for the gravity equation. American Economic Review, 69:106-
16. 
Anderson, J.E., van Wincoop, E., 2003. Gravity with gravitas: a solution to the border puzzle. American 
Economic Review, 93(1):170-192. 
Anderson, J.E., van Wincoop, E.,2004. Trade costs. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(3):691-751.   22 
Bagnasco, A., 1977. Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., 2009. Bonus vetus OLS: A simple method for approximating international 
trade-cost effects using the gravity equation. Journal of International Economics, 77(1):77-85. 
Baldwin, R., Taglioni, D., 2006. Gravity for Dummies and Dummies for Gravity Equations. NBER Working 
Paper 12516, http://www.nber.org/papers/w12516. 
Becattini, G., 1990. The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion. In F. Pyke, G. Becattini 
and  W.  Sengenberger  (eds.)  Industrial  districts  and  inter-firm  co-operation  in  Italy,  Geneva, 
International Institute for Labour Studies, 52-74. 
Becattini, G., 2007. Il calabrone Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Behrens, K., Lamorgese, A.R., Ottaviano, G.I.P., Tabuchi, T. 2007. Changes in transport and non-transport 
costs:  Local  vs  global  impacts  in  a  spatial  network.  Regional  Science  and  Urban  Economics, 
37:625–648. 
Bergstrand, J.H., 1985. The gravity equation in international trade: some microeconomic foundations and 
empirical evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(3):474-481.  
Bergstrand,  J.H.,  1989.  The  generalized  gravity  equation,  monopolistic  competition,  and  the  factor-
proportions theory in international trade. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(1):143-153.  
Bosker, M., Garretsen, H., 2007. Trade Costs, Market Access and Economic Geography: Why the Empirical 
Specification of Trade Costs Matters, CESIFO WP N. 2071, August. 
Bosker,  M.,  Brakman  S.,  Garretsen,  H.,  Schram,  M.  2007.  Adding  geography  to  the  new  economic 
geography, CESIFO WP N. 2038, June. 
Breusch,  T.,  Pagan,  A.  (1979)  A  simple  test  of  heteroskedasticity  and  random  coefficient  variation. 
Econometrica, 47:1287-1294. 
Burger M.J., van Oort F.G., Linders G.J.M., 2009. On the Specification of the Gravity Model of Trade: 
Zeros, Excell Zeros and Zero-Inflated Estimation. Spatial Economic Analysis (forthcoming) 
Brusco, S., 1990. The idea of the industrial district: Its genesis. In F. Pyke, G. Becattini and W. Sengenberger 
(eds.) Industrial districts and inter-firm co-operation in Italy, Geneva, International Institute for 
Labour Studies, 10-19. 
Carrère, C., 2006. Revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade flows with proper specification 
of the gravity model. European Economic Review, 50:223-247. 
Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.  
Chen, N., 2004. Intra-national versus international trade in the European Union: why do national borders 
matter? Journal of International Economics, 63:93–118. 
Chenery, H.B. 1962. Development policies for Southern Italy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 76(4): 
515:547.  
Cheng,  I.H., Wall, H.J., 2003. Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity models of trade and integration. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 1999-010D. 
Deardorff, A.V., 1998. Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a neoclassical world? In J. A. 
Frankel (ed.). The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Egger, P., 2000. A note on the proper econometric specification of the gravity equation. Economics Letters 
66:25-31. 
Eichengreen, B., Irwin, D.A., 1998. The role of history in bilateral trade flows, in (ed.). The Regionalization 
of the World Economy (Ed.) J.A. Frankel, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 33-57. 
European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm. 
Faini,  R.,  Galli,  G.,  Gennari,  P.,  Rossi,  F.  1997.  An  empirical  puzzle:  Falling  migration  and  growing 
unemployment differentials among Italian regions, European Economic Review, 41: 571-579. 
Feenstra, R., 2003. Advanced international trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.   23 
Fingleton, B. and P. McCann, 2007, Sinking the Iceberg? On the Treatment of Transport Costs in New 
Economic Geography, in B. Fingleton (ed.), New Directions in Economic Geography, Edward Elgar, 
pp. 168-204. 
Flowerdew, R., Aitkin, M., 1982. A method of fitting the gravity model based on the Poisson distribution. 
Journal of Regional Science, 22:191-202.  
Frankel, J.A., 1997.  Regional trading  blocs  in the world  trading  system. Washington,  DC:  Institute for 
International Economics. 
Frankel,  J.,  Rose,  A.K.,  2002.  An  estimate  of  the  effect  of  common  currencies  on  trade  and  income. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:437-466. 
Fratianni,  M.,  Kang,  H.,  2006.  Heterogeneous  distance-elasticities  in  trade  gravity  models.  Economics 
Letters, 90(1):68-71.  
Fratianni, M., Marchionne, F., 2008. Heterogeneity In Trade Costs. Economics Bulletin, 6(48):1-14. 
Fratianni,  M.,  Marchionne,  F.,  Oh,  C.H.  2010.  Commentary  on  the  Gravity  Equation  in 
International Business, The Multinational Business Review, forthcoming. 
Fratianni, M., Marchionne, F., 2011 (forthcoming). The limits to integration. In M.N. Jovanovic 
(ed.). International Handbook of Economic Integration. Elgar. 
Fratianni, M., Oh, C.H. (2009). Expanding RTAs, trade flows, and the multinational enterprise. 
Journal of International Business Studies 40:1206-1227 doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.8  
Gould, D., 1994. “Immigrant links to the home country: Empirical implications for U.S. bilateral trade flows. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 69:301-316. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004. The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development. American 
Economic Review, 94(3):526-556. 
Hausman, J.A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6):1251-1271. 
Haveman, J., Hummels, D., 2004. Alternative hypotheses and the volume of trade: the gravity equation and 
the extent of specialization. Canadian Journal of Economics, 37(1):199-218. 
Haworth, J.M., Vincent, P.J., 1979. The stochastic disturbance specification and its implications for log-
linear regression. Environment and Planning A, 11:781-90.  
Head, K., Mayer, T., 2004. The Empirics of Agglomeration and Trade. In Handbook of Regional and Urban 
Economics, Elsevier, 4(59):2609-69.  
Head, K., Ries, J., 1998. Immigration and trade creation: Econometric evidence from Canada. Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 31:46-62. 
Helliwell, J.F., 1998. How much do national borders matter? Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Helliwell, J.F., 1999. Language and trade. In A. Breton(ed.) Exploring the economics of language, Ottawa, 
Department of Heritage, 26. 
Helpman,  E.,  Melitz,  M.,  Rubinstein,  Y.,  2008.  Estimating  Trade  Flows:  Trading  Partners  and  Trading 
Volumes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):441-487. 
Hummels, D., 2007. Transportation costs and international trade in the second era of globalization. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 21(3):131-154. 
Hummels, D., Ishii, J., Yi, K.M., 2001. The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade. 
Journal of International Economics, 54:75-96.  
Hutchinson, W., 2002. Does ease of communication increase trade? Commonality of language and bilateral 
trade. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 49:544-556. 
ISTAT. I.Stat data warehouse, http://www.istat.it/dati/i_stat.html.  
Istituto Tagliacarne. GeoWebStarter data warehouse, http://www.tagliacarne.it/gws/home.htm.  
Kang,  H.,  Fratianni,  M.,  2006.  International  trade,  OECD  membership,  and  religion.  Open  Economies 
Review, 17 (4-5):493-508.   24 
King, G., 1988. Statistical models for political science event counts: bias in conventional procedures and 
evidence  for  the  exponential  Poisson  regression  model.  American  Journal  of  Political  Science, 
32:838-63.  
Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy, 99(3):483-
499. 
La  Porta,  R.,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  F.,  Shleifer,  A.,  Vishn,  R.,  2000.  Investor  protection  and  corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58:3-27. 
Linders, G.J., De Groot, H.L.F., 2006. Estimation of the gravity equation in the presence of zero flows. 
Tinbergen  Institute  Discussion  Paper,  No.06-072/3,  available  at  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924160 
Lucas, R.E., 1988. On the Mechanism of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 22:3-42. 
Lutz, V., 1962. Italy. A study in economic development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Markusen,  A.,  1996.  Sticky  places  in  slippery  spaces:  A  typology  of  industrial  districts.  Economic 
Geography, 72(3):293-313. 
Martin, P., Ottaviano, G.I.P., 2001. Growth and agglomeration. International Economic Review, 42(4):947-
968. 
Martinez-Zarzoso, I., Nowak-Lehmann, F.D., Vollmer, S., 2007. The Log of Gravity Revisited, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999908. 
McCallum,  J.,  (1995)  National  borders  matter:  Canada–US  regional  trade  patterns.  American  Economic 
Review, 85(3):615–623. 
Mocetti, S. Porello, C. 2010. La mobilità del lavoro in Italia: nuove evidenze sulle dinamiche migratorie, 
Questioni di Economia e Finanza, Occasional Papers n. 61, Banca d’Italia, Roma. 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 2000. The six major puzzles in international macroeconomics: Is there a common 
cause?  In  B.  Bernanke  and  K.  Rogoff  (eds.).  NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual  2000,  339-390. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Oh, C.H., 2006. Technical appendix on the regional economic integration database. In M. Fratianni (ed.) 
Regional Economic Integration. Amsterdam, Elsevier JAI. 
Putnam, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton University 
Press. Princeton. 
Putnam, R., Helliwell, J.F., 1995. Social Capital and Economic Growth in Italy. Eastern Economic 
Journal, 21:295-307. 
Puga, D. 1999. The rise and fall of regional inequalities, European Economic Review, 43: 303-334.  
Rauch, J.E.,  1999.  Networks  versus  markets  in  international trade.  Journal  of  International  Economics, 
48:7–35. 
Rauch, J.E., Trindade, V., 2001. Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 84:116-130. 
Rose, A.K., 2000. One money, one market: the effect of currency unions on trade. Economic Policy, 30:7-46.  
Rose, A.K., van Wincoop, E., 2001. National money as a barrier to trade: The real case for monetary union. 
American Economic Review, 91(2):386-390.  
Santos-Silva,  J.M.C.,  Tenreyro,  S.,  2006.  The  Log  of  Gravity.  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics, 
88(4):641-658. 
Saxonhouse,  G.R.,  1976.  Estimated  Parameters  as  Dependent  Variables.  American  Economic  Review, 
66(1):178-183. 
Venables, A.J., 1996. Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries. International Economic Review, 
37:341-59. 
World Bank. World Development Indicators, World DataBank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do.    25 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics of STEP 1 (millions of US dollars for Exports, Yi and Yj) 
Panel A (N=103)  Mean  Median  Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
Yi  11,315.7  6,967.2  15,809.2  1,284.0  154,822.0 
ADJACENCY  0.155  0  0.362  0  1 
Panel B (N=188)  Mean  Median  Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
Yj  168,332.7  8,089.5  812,480.3  40.8  11,711,833.7 
RTA  0.071  0  0.257  0  1 
Inter-RTA  0.280  0  0.449  0  1 
MONEY  0.032  0  0.176  0  1 
ADJACENCY  0.022  0  0.147  0  1 
Panel C (N=972,754)  Mean  Median  Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
Exports
   2.6  0.1  18.1  0.9  1,531.7 
Yi
   16,434.0  9,198.2  22,235.2  1,284.0  154,821.9 
Yj
   417,360.6  60,817.2  1,320,683.7  40.8  11,711,833.7 
Distance
   4,451  2,641  3,962  69  18,932 
RTA  0.183  0  0.387  0  1 
Inter-RTA  0.203  0  0.402  0  1 
MONEY  0.089  0  0.285  0  1 
ADJACENCY  0.003  0  0.057  0  1 
NOTE:  
Panel A: statistics on provinces from ISTAT (i=103, j=1, k=1, t=10); Panel B: statistics on countries 
from World Development Indicator (i=1, j=188, k=1, t=10); Panel C: statistics on province-country-
sector from ISTAT (i=103, j=188, k=21, t=10). 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics of STEP 2 (Euro for  i y ) 
Panel D (N=103)  Mean  Median  Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
1995 , i y   13,982  14,588  3,639  6,983  22,367 
2004 , i y   20,003  20,871  4,561  12,288  30,629 
IND1995  0.334  0.320  0.181  0.080  0.879 
IND(LG/SM)2001  0.401  0.329  0.293  0.010  1.640 
INF1991  1.071  0.917  0.674  0.310  5.468 
INF(TOT) 1991  1.014  0.885  0.598  0.293  5.083 
INS1995  3.764  3.487  1.409  1.441  8.324 
INS(CHECKS) 1995  0.478  0.480  0.160  0.091  0.880 
SC1995  0.028  0.023  0.022  0.000  0.105 
SC(DEBT)1995  0.029  0.024  0.031  0.000  0.157 
HC1995  1.356  0.204  2.031  0.000  8.944 
HC(HIGH)1995  1.244  0.180  1.882  0.000  8.354 
NOTE: 
Income:  y = provincial per-capita added value in euro (ISTAT). 
Industrial Structure:  IND = industrial added value on total added value (ISTAT);  
  IND(LG/SM) = added value of large on small-medium size firms (ISTAT). 
Infrastructure:  INF = economic infrastructure composite index (TAGLIACARNE); 
  INF(TOT) = total infrastructure composite index (TAGLIACARNE).  
Institutional Efficiency: 
 
INS = years taken to complete a first-degree trial by provincial courts (Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales, 2004); 
  INS(CHECKS) = frequency of residents who have used checks in the year (Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004).  
Social Capital:  SC = number of blood bags per million inhabitants (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004);  
  SC(DEBT) = frequency of residents who have received loans from fiends and family 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004). 
Human Capital:  HC = first and second level degree for million inhabitants (TAGLIACARNE);  
  HC(HIGH) = second level degree for million inhabitants (TAGLIACARNE). 
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Table 2: Value of cells in the trade matrix    
Sector 





, ,  
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry   0.31505371 
Fish, Fishing Products   0.07920884 
Coal, Lignite, Peat, Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Uranium, Thorium   0.03672795 
Metal Ores, Other Mining, Quarrying Products   0.15978620 
Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco   0.39478414 
Textiles, Textile Products   0.41405701 
Leather, Leather Products   0.30810783 
Wood, Products of Wood, Cork (Except Furniture), Articles of Straw, Plaiting Materials   0.27897129 
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Recorded Media, Printing Services   0.29880706 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel   0.09446395 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, Man-Made Fibres   0.39609068 
Rubber, Plastic Products   0.37533051 
Other Non Metallic Mineral Products   0.37696757 
Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal Products   0.42533051 
Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.   0.51390725 
Electrical and Optical Equipment   0.42727742 
Transport Equipment   0.35043379 
Other Manufactured Goods N.E.C.   0.39884321 
Electrical Energy, Gas, Steam, Water   0.00343937 
Real Estate, Renting, Business Services   0.08559182 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services   0.06893720   27 
Figure 2: Maps of 103 Italian Provinces: IND, INF, INS, SC, HC, and UN (Colors by quintiles). 
 
     
     
     
 
NOTE: Sources are ISTAT, TAGLIACARNE, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004).   28 
 
Table 3: Step 1 – OLS – Provincial distance interacting with sectors. 1995-2004 (N=972,754) 
COEFFICIENT 
Method 
(a)  (b)  (c)
 □
 
Year\Province\Country Dummies  Yes\Yes\Yes  Yes\No\No  Yes\Yes\Yes 
Constant  -7.632***  -17.53***  1.256 
ln(Yi)  0.503***  0.903***  0.247*** 
ln(Yj)  0.656***  0.536***  0.513*** 
ADJACENCY  0.669***  1.505***  0.745*** 
RTA  -1.507***  -0.0557  -1.518*** 
inter-RTA  -0.461***  0.123***  -0.0826 
MONEY  0.0971***  0.0820***  0.0790*** 
d*Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry  -1.417***  -0.802***  -0.968*** 
d*Fish, Fishing Products  -1.809***  -1.203***  -1.153*** 
d*Coal, Lignite, Peat, Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Uranium, Thorium  -2.019***  -1.430***  -1.104*** 
d*Metal Ores, Other Mining, Quarrying Products  -1.589***  -0.979***  -1.090*** 
d*Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco  -1.243***  -0.621***  -0.858*** 
d*Textiles, Textile Products  -1.232***  -0.604***  -0.816*** 
d*Leather, Leather Products  -1.326***  -0.700***  -0.880*** 
d*Wood, Products of Wood, Cork (Except Furniture), Articles of Straw, Plaiting Materials  -1.520***  -0.901***  -1.052*** 
d*Pulp. Paper, Paper Products, Recorded Media, Printing Services  -1.406***  -0.780***  -0.954*** 
d*Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel  -1.596***  -0.998***  -0.951*** 
d*Chemicals, Chemical Products, Man-Made Fibres  -1.203***  -0.579***  -0.823*** 
d*Rubber, Plastic Products  -1.294***  -0.667***  -0.896*** 
d*Other Non Metallic Mineral Products  -1.296***  -0.671***  -0.899*** 
d*Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal Products  -1.221***  -0.593***  -0.829*** 
d*Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.  -1.094***  -0.467***  -0.725*** 
d*Electrical and Optical Equipment  -1.238***  -0.608***  -0.832*** 
d*Transport Equipment  -1.284***  -0.658***  -0.858*** 
d*Other Manufactured Goods N.E.C.  -1.270***  -0.641***  -0.866*** 
d*Electrical Energy, Gas, Steam, Water  -1.829***  -1.258***  -1.115*** 
d*Real Estate, Renting, Business Services  -1.859***  -1.254***  -1.286*** 
d*Other Community, Social and Personal Services  -1.780***  -1.174***  -1.222*** 
Observations  972,754  972,754  625,734 
Number of pairs    16,629  14,322 
R
2  0.438  0.352  0.431 
F-test  336.5  49,406  162,374 
Prob>F  0  0  0 
LR-All
2 c  (Likelihood Ratio test statistic on province, country and time FE)  134,088.40  1,255.70  6,540.43 
DoF LR-All (Degree of Freedom of Likelihood Ratio on province, country and time FE)  297  9  297 
Prob LR-All >
2 c (P-value of Likelihood Ratio test on province, country and time FE)  0  0  0 
BPLM Test (Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for RE)    1,793,847.00  187,342.50 
DoF BPLM (Degree of Freedom of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for RE)    1  1 
Prob BPLM >
2 c  (P-value of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for RE)    0  0 
NOTE: See text for (a), (b), (c) methods. RE = random effects; FE = fixed effects. 
□ Exports over $30,000 for computational reasons. Cluster 
correction on pairs and robust standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 3: Maps of 103 Italian Provinces: per-capita GDP of 1995, trade costs over 1995-2004, and per-capita GDP of 2004. 
 
 
Note: See text for methods (c). Green colors in the left and right maps represent mean-adjusted provincial per-capita GDP respectively for 1995 and 2004; ranges in the legend are common between these maps. Red colors in the 
middle map represents mean-adjusted provincial trade costs derived from 21 sectoral distance elasticities of Gravity Equation Model (Beta). In all maps, first and last ranges in the legend are larger than other ranges because they 
include extreme value.  
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Table 4a: Step 2 -Trade Costs Regressions. Dependent Variable: 
2004 1995 , - i b  
VARIABLES  TC0  TC1  TC2  TC3  TC4  TC5  TC0
-  TC0
+ 
Constant  0.0126  0.00406  0.0116  0.0175  0.0118  0.0120  0.0145  0.0973** 
1995 , i y (in mln EUR)  -3.106***  -2.836***  -3.157***  -3.661***  -3.098***  -3.164***  -3.352***  -13.45*** 
IND1995  -0.0419*  -0.0505**  -0.0412*  -0.0422*  -0.0395*  -0.0412*  -0.0494**  -0.319*** 
IND(LG/SM)2001    0.0192             
INF1991  -0.00118  -0.00315    -0.00156  -0.00113  -0.00117  -0.00177  -0.0232 
INF(TOT) 1991      -0.000793           
INS1995  0.00185  0.00272  0.00188    0.00153  0.00185  0.00217  0.0112 
INS(CHECKS) 1995        0.00645         
SC1995  0.00365  0.0779  0.00657  -0.0192    0.00667  0.0142  0.359 
SC(DEBT)1995          0.0466       
HC1995  -0.00065  -0.00052  -0.00061  -0.00065  -0.00074    -0.00100  -0.0140*** 
HC(HIGH)1995            -0.00051     
Observations  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92 
R
2  0.384  0.415  0.383  0.380  0.386  0.383  0.436  0.696 
F Test  53.41  58.47  55.04  50.72  56.26  52.85  68.11  235.7 
Prob > F  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
NOTE:  see  Table  1b  for  variable  meaning.  Robust  standard  errors  (same  results  with  bootstrap  method);  TC0  =  benchmark  specification  for  3 
components trade costs; TC0
+ = benchmark specification for 5 components trade costs; TCx = robustness using alternative or additional measure for the 
corresponding control. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4b: Step 2 - Income Regressions. Dependent Variable: 
2004 , i y (in thousand EUR) 
VARIABLES  IN0  IN1  IN2  IN3  IN4  IN5  IN0
-  IN0
+ 
Constant  -3.367  -3.322  -3.596*  -9.741***  -1.896  -3.377*  -3.253  -2.362 
2004 1995 , - i b   -29.28***  -28.99***  -29.23***  -30.58***  -32.43***  -29.43***  -30.46***  -11.68*** 
IND1995  7.755***  7.809***  7.563***  5.067*  10.37***  7.747***  7.369***  4.610 
IND(LG/SM)2001    -0.106             
INF1991  1.605***  1.615***    1.440***  1.472**  1.586***  1.574***  1.301** 
INF(TOT) 1991      2.010***           
INS1995  -0.741***  -0.746***  -0.730***    -0.947***  -0.739***  -0.722***  -0.622** 
INS(CHECKS) 1995        10.80***         
SC1995  49.46***  49.03***  51.34***  35.68**    49.56***  49.35***  50.96*** 
SC(DEBT)1995          1.256       
HC1995  0.369**  0.368**  0.274*  0.279**  0.342**    0.354**  0.201 
HC(HIGH)1995            0.416***     
Observations  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92 
R
2  0.668  0.668  0.677  0.702  0.632  0.670  0.671  0.682 
F Test  247.8  276.0  262.4  279.2  225.0  272.2  284.7  280.4 
Prob > F  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
NOTE: see Table 1b for variable meaning. Robust standard errors (same results with bootstrap method); IN0 = benchmark  specification using 3 
components trade costs; IN0
+ = benchmark specification using 5 components trade costs; INx = robustness using alternative or additional measure for the 
corresponding control. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5: Pairwise Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Trade Costs for 103 Italian Provinces. 
2004 1995 , - i b   Method  (a)  (b)  (c) 
Method  Estimator  OLS  PML  OLS  PML  OLS  PML 
(a)  OLS  1.0000                
PML  0.9889  1.0000          
(b)  OLS  0.9169  0.9181  1.0000        
PML  0.9988  0.9830  0.9144  1.0000      
(c) 
OLS  0.9855  0.9995  0.9190  0.9795  1.0000    
PML  0.9184  0.9110  0.9969  0.9196  0.9114  1.0000 
Note: see text for method (a), (b), and (c). 
2004 1995 , - i b = mean-adjusted provincial trade costs derived using 
sectoral distance elasticities from Gravity Equation Model. Estimators: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; PML = 
Poisson Maximum Likelihood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 